At modern times, democracy is regarded as a major source of political obligation, in the sense that people will regard it as their duty to obey the decisions made by the state which is ’democratic’. Despite few states deny themselves being democratic, the term itself and many related concepts such as power, freedom and justice are ’essentially contested concepts’, since there have been no consensus on what these terms exactly are, what they ought to look like and how to empirically verify them. This article will not consider these topics whose boundaries are not clear, but rather focus on one necessary value embedded in democracy which is the rule of the people that to a large extent is ensured by a legislature expressing people’s preference (Garner et al. , 2009, pg. 72). The value and importance of an electoral system lies in its capacity in translating voter preference into decisions made by the state. After a brief description of the electoral systems in use in Canada and Singapore, this article will discuss some deficiencies in the Canadian single member plurality electoral system and evaluate purposed alternatives. This articles will also consider the relevance of these reform measures in the context of Singapore.

Both Canada and Singapore use majoritarian electoral system in which winner is determined by a simple majority. There are some nuances between the two. The single member plurality system, which is used in the election of members of Canadian House of Commons as well as provincial legislature elections, uses single-member constituencies and under which voters vote for candidates rather than parties. The electoral system of Singapore is classified as party-block-vote (International IDEA , 2009) under which there are both multi-member constituencies where voters choose party and the party with the most votes is able to fill in every seat in that district, and single-member constituencies which operate similarly as that in Canada. Despite differences, these two ’winner-takes-all’ majoritarian systems share advantages as well as criticisms.

Before evaluating merits and demerits of an electoral system, criteria should be specified. It should be noted that in order not to fall into arguments on values, for example whether it is more important for an electoral system to produce ’stable’ government or to represent as diverse the interest in society as possible which are difficult to empirically ascertain and dependent on normative assumptions, emphasis should be paid on what the function of election is and an electoral system should be evaluated on the basis of performing that function.

According to (Guy , 2001, pg. 357), important functions of an election include serving as a vehicle of political succession, aggregating individual choices, providing a channel for political socialization, education and participation. In a nutshell, elections should enable citizens to choose leaders and influence policies. At this point, the efficacy of elections should be qualified as nearly all states nowadays stage elections but certainly not all are considered to be ruled by the people. Whether people’s will can be genuinely reflected by the government’s policy also depends on the broader political system and political culture. However, election is still a very important contributing factor into constructing a ’healthy’ democracy and thus discussions abound on the issues of electoral reform in Canada. The rest of this article will focus on what Singapore can learn from those reform measures carried out in Canada.

One evident indication of the need to reform is the low level of voter turnout, especially in the youth group. In 2008 election, 59.1% of registered voters turned out. More seriously, in 2000 election, only 22% of voters aged between 18 and 20 and 28% of voters aged between 21 and 24 bothered to vote (Pammett & LeDuc , 2003). Based on this figure, some people claim that youth are under-represented in the legislature. Furthermore there are other groups like women, minority groups and aboriginal peoples, to name a few, who also claim the current electoral system is unfair to them (Cool , 2008). Other than these symptoms, some researchers have looked into the workings of the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system and attribute many other vices to it. Firstly, the FPTP has been blamed for the disproportionality in translating votes into seats. Despite one of the virtues of FPTP is to produce majority (or ’stable’) government in terms of seats, few governments have won the majority in terms of popular vote. All but three of the 28 elections held since 1921 resulted in a government with a majority of seats supported by a majority of votes. Instances that a winning party got fewer votes than its competitor exist (Guy , 2001, pg. 360). This undermines the legitimacy of FPTP and makes people question whether its tendency to produce majority government is ’too much of a good thing’. Secondly, FPTP is being criticized for undermining national unity. Since parties will maximize their number of winning seats by focusing on specific constituencies where they have a high chance of being elected, parties that have strong regional support but no broad appeal in other parts of the country have emerged. It seems odd for a party such as Bloc Québécois which puts provincial interest on top of the collective interest of the state to be able to occupy 15.9% of the seats in federal legislature which is supposed to stand for the interest of the whole Canada. Thirdly, FPTP is seen as preventing diversity of views and an effective opposition. Although for an outsider from the fact that Progressive Conservative has been running Alberta ever since 1971 it would seem that Alberta is a land of converservatism. However, the political landscape becomes much less clear-cut if one considers the percentage of popular votes received by parties. In the case of Alberta Progressive Conservative, it takes up 86.7% of the seats with 52.7% of the popular support. Such frustration of those who voted for the losing candidate is seen in a reply to the Law Commission of Canada, "The West is not just right wing. Not all Quebecers want to separate... These myths have lives of their own and destructively influence Canadians’ perceptions of each other" (Law Commission of Canada , 2004, pg. 11).

One general election in Singapore will give the government maximum 5 years of legal terms, within which the government has the discretion to decide when to hold election. Generally, these elections are considered to be free and fair, however, criticisms abound on other issues relating to the election. Because of the similarities in electoral system, Singapore shares many of the criticisms directed at the Canadian FPTP, in addition to its uniqueness. Its ’Party-Block-Vote’ with a mixture of Single Member Constituencies and Group Representation Constituencies (GRC) have been blamed for producing the de facto ’one-party state’, silencing the views of the opposition party and thus significantly reducing the power of parliament to check the executive. As voting is compulsory in Singapore, voter turn-out is usually at 95%, despite claims that youths are actually disinterested in politics and questions on the quality of participation. Another difference between Singapore and Canada is that attacks on the Singapore electoral system are often linked with attacks on the broader political system. The defects on electoral system, together with allegations on restrictions of press-freedom, limitations in civil society, etc. are regarded by some as a result of the hegemony of the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) and its measures to monopolize the political scene (Reporters Without Borders , 2008). Bearing these similarities and differences in mind this article will discuss some reform measures to the Canadian electoral system and their relevance to the reform in Singapore.

Several alternatives electoral systems have been proposed. At federal level, the Law Commission of Canada recommended a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system (Law Commission of Canada , 2004, pg. 101). Under this system, a voter will vote for both the candidate that is to represent her riding and a party. Some members of parliament direct represent respective ridings, some come from the party list whose number is set such that the proportion of seats in parliament a party takes reflects voters party preference. At provincial level, some other models are proposed, most of which are variants of proportional representations. Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick and Ontario recommended MMP as similar to the one recommended by the Law Commission of Canada. British Columbia proposed the Single Transferable Vote system. Quebec proposed a different model in which a voter only casts one vote. However, in addition to the single member ridings there are districts which have additional candidates who are drawn from the party list and to compensate for any disproportionality resulted in the election results of those single member constituencies (?). There are disagreements on which model could best translate voter preference to legislature composition and serve other functions of elections, but in light of the criticisms on FPTP discussed above, any of these proposed alternatives which have introduced some degree of proportional representation (PR), among others, would seem to perform better than FPTP. If further studies on weighing the cost of switching and the benefit from the new system confirm those recommendations, it will seem natural for some reform to be carried out.

Singapore also adopts a variant of plurality-majority electoral system and faces similar criticisms that this system could not produce a legislature that fairly represents voters’ preference. Indeed, in the latest 2006 general election, the ruling PAP was able to secure all 84 but 2 seats with the support of 66.6% of popular vote (Elections Department , 2006). However, most of the criticisms are aimed at some electoral innovations which the opposition claimed that these innovations had raised the threshold for them to win any seat (?, pg. 167), such like the introduction of GRC and non-elected MP, linking MP with town council, changes to electoral boundaries, etc. Thus far, there has been no serious deliberations on adding any element of PR. Such lack of concern for adopting PR may partly be attributed to the lack of strong opposition parties on a par with PAP. It has been noted that at present times, opposition parties tend to be ’parties of personality’, i.e. they are very dependent on the charisma of individual leaders and could not offer a team of competent candidates. They have also been accused of being ’parties of pressure’ responding to PAP’s policies rather than offering serious policy alternatives (Rodan , 1996, pg. 119). Had Singapore adopted PR in the 2006 election, based on popular vote, opposition parties would have had to present at least 28 candidates. They may be able to present a serious challenge in some constituencies, but it is unlikely they can be considered as an alternative to PAP in the short run.

Next we shall discuss some general features in the electoral reform process in Canada that are relevent in any democracies.

A feature in the Canadian electoral reform measures is that they are most prominent at the provincial level, in other words Canadians provinces, rather than the federal government, have taken their own initiatives in trying to evaluate the current FPTP and various alternatives. It has been reported that since 2003, provinces including British Columbia, New Brunswick, Ontario, Prince Edward Island and Quebec have assigned commissions or Citizens’ Assembly to study electoral systems and give recommendations (Barnes & Robertson , 2008). What is different in this consultation process is that British Columbia and Ontario established Citizens’ Assembly as a tool to deliberate between current system as well as different alternatives. In the case of British Columbia, two members, one man and one woman, from each riding would be selected randomly to join the assembly. Additional measures were taken to ensure that the assembly also had a fair representation of various social backgrounds such like ethnicity. After nearly 1 year of operating, the assembly finalized a report which recommended British Columbia switch from FPTP to Single-Transferable-Vote system, which is a variant of proportional representation. Policy deliberation involving such wide participation was first seen there (Citizens’ Assembly , 2003). Although the ensuing referendum failed to approve the purposed electoral reform, the activities of this assembly, which included public hearings, proposal submissions and research, has greatly increased citizens’ awareness on the electoral reform issues and laid down the road leading to future reform. More importantly, the establishment of Citizens’ Assembly was also an innovation which has demonstrated the value and effectiveness of mass participation in policy deliberation.

Democracy does not only manifest in voting, but also in the whole decision-making process, from the formation of ideas to the review of policy implementation. The Canadian electoral reform initiatives have attracted wide participation, besides those provincial commissions. Studies have been conducted by scholars to draw lessons from other countries to evaluate different electoral systems. Recognizing that low youth participation is a part of the ’democratic deficit’ which is attributed to FPTP, activities such as essay writing competitions on alternative electoral models have been organized to draw the attention of youths. Interestingly, the excitement of being in the Citizens’ Assembly of British Columbia was imbued in one of the competition essays (Freeman , 2008). This electoral reform process demonstrates how a country with a robust democratic political system could adjust the way the country runs in a smooth way. This self-healing capacity should constitute an important and necessary factor in determining whether a country can be classified as a ’strong’ state.

Another interesting feature in this ongoing electoral reform process is the way this ’democratic deficit’ is approached. Most noticeably is how the delineation of boundaries makes the discussion more relevant and efficient. Fundamental criteria for assessing electoral systems, in accordance with the function of elections, have been agreed upon. Such criteria include fair representation of parties, demographics and regions; effective and accountable government; effective opposition and diversity of ideas; direct link between riding and representatives; equal voting-power. These criteria are articulated by commissions at both federal and provincial level (Law Commission of Canada , 2004, pg. 58) (Citizens’ Assembly , 2004, pg. 2). Another commonality among different reform initiatives is the recognition on how far the reform should proceed. It has been a common understanding that at present time, constitution should not be modified; the size of House of Commons should not be drastically changed, etc (Law Commission of Canada , 2004, pg. xvii). Although at provincial level, reform proposals may be different (?). Such common ground between different reform initiatives which have realistic targets makes one’s experience compatible with other’s, facilitates the cooperation between federal units and ultimately makes it easier for possible reforms to be implemented at federal level.

Elections are not a guarantee for ’popular rule’ and every electoral system has its defects. However, through the deliberation process on electoral reform, the strength of democracy and how it should work have been demonstrated. Just like Canada have studied other countries’ electoral systems, its own reform can also shed light on how to solve ’democratic deficits’ in other countries.

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